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Democratic diplomacy was made popular by American president Woodrow Wilson, most 
notably in the first of his famous ’fourteen points’ included in his speech to Congress on 
January 1918. The idea was that transparent diplomatic discussion, responsive to the views and 
criticism of the electorate as expressed in the free public discourse, would supersede the pre-
WW1 system of secret diplomatic alliances that dominated European politics and was deemed 
to be the source of instability. The mythical ‘world public opinion’, it was thought, would force 
governments to adhere to higher standards of morality and justice and would eventually lead to 
a much safer and more peaceful world.  
 
Developments between the world wars have brought much disillusionment to proponents of this 
idealistic concept and it mainly prevails today only in a new guise of ‘public diplomacy’. In this 
incarnation, the choice of public diplomacy over secret diplomacy is perceived as motivated by 
utilitarian rather than normative considerations – a tool to influence public opinion rather than 
to express the ‘true’ preferences of the electorate. 
 
Despite of that, this paper suggests that in both intrastate and inter-entity ethno-national conflict 
it would be beneficial to evolve the ‘hypothetical future’ most democratically preferred by both 
sides to the ethnic conflict. The mechanism to achieve that may be viewed as an elaborate and 
radical ad-hoc form of democratic diplomacy where opinions of the electorates evolve to 
become well-considered and well-informed and directly influence evolving ‘hypothetical 
futures’ proposed in a sort of a competitive open tender. Some of the theoretical merits of such 
an approach are greater likelihood to identify a jointly agreed ‘hypothetical future’, higher 
quality solution leading to wider support, more public legitimacy and a substantial contribution 
to mutual ripening, to a better fit between ethos and reality and to internal stability.  
 
Initial empirical findings from an in-depth questionnaire administered over the Internet to 61 
Israeli citizens, selected from a panel to demographically represent the Israeli population, show 
that despite little previous exposure to the ideas of democratic diplomacy, only 10% would like 
to leave the current mechanism for negotiation with the Palestinians as is, while 90% opted for 
various options that make diplomacy more democratic. Such a reform would also wield wider 




For the past six years I have been working on formalizing and grounding an intuition 
that intractable conflicts and cleavages, like the Jewish-Palestinian conflict or the 
Greek-Turk conflict in Cyprus, stand much better chance of being resolved 
satisfactorily by dedicated deeply democratic mechanisms than by the conventional 
mechanisms of negotiations between leaders or representatives of the conflicting 
parties, which, if successful are then subject to parliamentary or popular ratification 
(See Tzur 2004 & 2008
1
). 
In an effort to make what I’m proposing more accessible, I colloquially began to 
term it Democratic Diplomacy, as it calls for institutional involvement of the people 
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of both sides in proposing possible agreed future scenarios, considering and 
deliberating then, rating them against each other and evolving them until a 
Democratically Preferred Future Scenario (DPFS) emerges or until it becomes clear 
that no scenario of coordinated progress is democratically preferred by both sides over 
the status-quo. 
Not versed in the history of diplomacy and foreign policy, I have never 
encountered the term Democratic Diplomacy before – neither in the public discourse 
nor in the professional literature I covered – so I initially assumed I can use it as is. In 
fact, when just beginning thinking about this paper, I wanted to simply title it 
Democratic Diplomacy and present the case for interrelating the terms in general and 
in the context of resolving intractable conflicts in particular. Just for the sake of 
prudence, I ran a search on the term “Democratic Diplomacy” and discovered that I 
was nearly a hundred years late in coining it. 
This discovery sent me on an unplanned quest to understand the original use of 
the concept of Democratic Diplomacy in the early decades of the twentieth century, 
identify the context and reasons for its rise between the world wars, its fall after WW2 
and what begins to look like a possible reincarnation in a different form today. In the 
paper I summarize the quest and identify what bearing the findings may have on the 
prospects of democratically resolving intractable ethnic conflicts in today’s world. 
Against this historical political science backdrop, I will then present initial 
empirical findings from an in-depth recent Internet survey of a representative sample 
of Israelis. These findings clearly indicate that, from the polity’s point of view, there 
is great support for a democratic reform in the mechanism of evolving and approving 
an agreement with the Palestinians. Moreover, respondents not only normatively 
prefer a reformed mechanism but they also expect it to yield faster and more long-
lasting results. 
If clear public support for democratization of diplomacy exists on both sides of 
a conflict, this by itself is a compelling reason for considering such a reform. A 
mechanism that enjoys wide legitimacy has better chances of producing a sustainable 
solution and discouraging ‘spoilers’. In considering the shape of such a reformed 




Jönsson & Aggestam (2007) identify six common meanings of the word ‘diplomacy’: 
content of foreign affairs as a whole (roughly the same as foreign policy), conduct of 
foreign policy (statecraft), management of foreign policy by negotiation, use of 
diplomats organized in a diplomatic service, the intelligent and tactful manner for 
conducting relations and the art or skills of professional diplomats. They then proceed 
to suggest an overarching definition of diplomacy as a transhistorical international 
institution that, like war, perpetually influences relations between polities throughout 
history. 
Adding the not less vague term ‘democratic’ to create the term ‘democratic 
diplomacy’ leaves many interpretations possible. In fact the term is rarely used in the 
literature (It has no definition in Britannica or Wikipedia and only 161 mentions in the 
google scholar search engine compared to 8,500 for ‘public diplomacy’) and people 
who use it do so in a variety of meanings.  
One thing is clear though. Until WWI, diplomacy in all of its meanings, even in 
democratic states, was professionally practiced outside the public eye and locus of 
democratic interest. Democratic diplomacy linked the previously unrelated concepts, 
giving the people some foothold on diplomacy and perhaps also transferring some of 
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the principles guiding the internal conduct of liberal democracies (like the basic 
equality of people) into the international (or even the inter-collective) arena. Mcgrew, 
in a recent account of the related (and more modern) concept of transnational 
democracy notes that: 
  
Until comparatively recently, democratic theorists rarely ventured beyond the state since 
prevailing orthodoxy presumed a categorical distinction between the moral realm of the 
sovereign political community and the amoral realm of the anarchical society… theorists 
of modern democracy tended to bracket the anarchical society whilst theorists of 
international relations tended to bracket democracy. Of course, there were exceptions. 
Classical liberal internationalism, expressed in the ideas of Bentham, Woodrow Wilson, 
and proponents of functionalism, such as Mitrany, advocated a more democratic 
international order… In its earliest manifestations liberal-internationalism presented a 
radical challenge to the prevailing realpolitik vision of world order: that is of might as 
right. From Locke, through Bentham and Mill, to Woodrow Wilson the essence of the 
liberal-internationalist project has been the construction of an international order based 
on the rule of law and cooperation between states. 
  
This section reviews some of the (few) writings discussing democratic 




Democratic diplomacy was made popular by American president Woodrow Wilson, 
most notably in the first of his famous ’fourteen points’ included in his speech to 
Congress on January 1918. 
 
Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private 
international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and 
in the public view.  
 
The idea was that transparent diplomatic discussion, responsive to the views and 
criticism of the electorate as expressed in the free public discourse, would supersede 
the pre-WW1 system of secret diplomatic alliances that dominated European politics 
and was deemed to be the source of instability. The mythical ‘world public opinion’, 
it was thought, would force governments to adhere to higher standards of morality and 
justice and would eventually lead to a much safer and more peaceful world. 
While Wilson and others, like British conservative Robert Cecil who wrote:  
 
everything depneds on public opinion. This means that the public must have an opinion 
on international affairs and its opinion must be right” and when defending the Versailles 
Treaty “What we rely upon is public opinion… and if we are wrong about it, then the 
whole thing is wrong. 
 
wanted to reform international anarchy by curtailing secret diplomacy, British 
Liberal-Radical and Labour internationalists demanded more. They wanted popular or 
democratic control over foreign policy (Millen-Penn, 1995). 
Democratic diplomacy was first practiced in the Paris Peace Conference 
following the end of WWI. The one-year long (18 January 1919 – 21 January 1920) 
conference brought together national delegations, usually headed by elected 
presidents, prime ministers or senior ministers and not by professional diplomats. This 
condition of ‘permanent conference’ was institutionalized in the ‘league of nations’ 
inaugurated at the end of the conference. 
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While public enthusiasm and hopes from the new way of handling foreign 
affairs were initially very high, it soon became clear that it too is far from ideal. 
Rather than look at radical institutional solutions to the real problems standing in the 
way of implementing the ideal of democratic diplomacy, the pendulum began to 
gradually sway back towards elitism and professionalism under the impression that 
the ideal is not effectively practical and the masses cannot be trusted to make the right 
decisions. 
However, as the fundamental logic of democracy could not be openly 
denounced and no one wanted to advocate a return to oligarchic diplomacy, if even 
for the real concern that people in democracies would no longer be willing to fight 
and die for foreign policies they haven’t sanctioned, a range of syntheses between the 
old and new diplomacies began to emerge.  
 
Council on Foreign Relations: ‘Scientific’ Policy and Public Education (~1920)  
Blaichman (2007) reviews the establishment of the influential Council on 
Foreign Relations in the United States as the elitist response to the perceived pitfalls 
of the conference. Wilson’s top adviser, Colonel Edward M. House, originally 
assembled a group of notable academics and intellectuals including Sidney E. Mezes, 
Walter Lippmann, Isaiah Bowman and others that were commissioned in 1917 to 
secretly research what would be the best ‘scientific’ policy in the interest of all 
nations for after the World War would end. The motivation to prepare so well for the 
peace conference was the belief that world public opinion would appreciate such 
thoroughness and reward America with increased influence over the outcome. 
In the conference however, it became obvious that the delegations were much 
more concerned about the heated public opinion at home than about the ‘cold 
scientific’ recommendations of the experts they brought with them. Moreover, the 
public spoke in many voices – it both demanded punishment for the perpetrators of 
the dreadful war and that there would be peace – thus putting many of the top leaders 
in precarious positions of possibly losing their political majorities. 
Founders of the CFR concluded that public opinion has proven disturbing rather 
than helpful and that the mass media found the conference boring and therefore didn’t 
perform its role in informing the public. Their solution was to form a body that 
undertakes to educate the public, or rather the elite, to develop the ‘right’ opinion, 
which would be self-consistent, based on the correct facts, ‘scientific’ and objective.  
In their mind, the educated public would not choose a policy, but rather affirm 
the policy that ‘reason dictates’. In other words, their version of democratic 
diplomacy was not that all people should be educated to be able to make up a well-
informed and well-considered mind on foreign affairs but rather educated to recognize 
that they must put their faith and support in the technocratic experts who would 
‘scientifically’ reach the right conclusion. Such an educated public opinion would 
become a progressive engine – the authoritative will of the nation fit for serving as an 
immediate and active force in negotiations. 
 
Harold Nicolson: Diluted Democratic Diplomacy (1935) 
 
I must begin with a few definitions and a few axioms. I shall be using the word 
“diplomacy” in its most general sense, meaning thereby the practice, rather than the 
theory, of international relations. I shall be using the term “democratic or modern 
diplomacy” as signifying a system under which the execution of foreign policy is 
subjected to the immediate, rather than to the ultimate, concurrence of the sovereign 
electorate (Nicolson, 1935) 
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Harold Nicolson was a British diplomat from 1909-1929, and he witnessed the 
birth of democratic diplomacy first hand as a junior diplomat to the Paris Peace 
Conference. At the time of writing he was on the verge of ‘changing sides’ and 
starting a 10-year career as a Member of Parliament.  In his paper “Modern Diplomacy 
and British Public Opinion” from which the above quote is taken, he goes on to say 
 
I shall proceed from the axiom that democratic diplomacy has in Great Britain 
superseded professional or oligarchic diplomacy… the system of democratic diplomacy 
has many virtues and several faults… its virtues are obvious and I hope enduring, its 
faults are obscure and, I earnestly believe, transitional. 
 
While heralding the triumph of democratic diplomacy only 16 years after its 
advent and defining it broadly to mean public involvement in the execution of public 
policy, his contention is that democracy has not yet learned how to exercise its 
sovereignty in a responsible manner because the public has considerable but 
uncoordinated knowledge, potential good sense, much unnecessary suspicion and a 
really alarming degree of perplexity.  
More important than the lack of knowledge is a feeling of being incompetent 
and unknowledgeable. Nicolson proposes that the British public should be assured 
that all is required of them is balance, patience, trustfulness and good sense (what he 
calls elsewhere “habits of correct and fundamental thinking” and today would 
probably be called deliberated and considered opinion) and not detailed knowledge of 
foreign affairs. If people would become less afraid of diplomacy they would also give 
it a more responsible and continuous attention. Basically he urges for creating the 
conditions that would allow citizens to express their normative preferences, for 
example by abandoning elitist jargon and publishing some internal policy analyses 
and memoranda. 
Nicolson claims that citizens’ perplexity is caused by lack of direction. In the 
19
th
 century the direction was clear and common to all Britons and parties – guarding 
the empire and establishing new markets. In the 20
th
 century the British citizen has 
become torn between nationalism and internationalism, right and left, which causes 
confusion and an inner conflict – between citizens and within each citizen. The 
doctrine of power competes with contradictory doctrine of peace, and the latter 
actually implies the end of the empire. In Nicolson’s view, as people are not educated 
to understand complexity and processes they tend to take a middle indecisive position 
rather than understand that the “principle of war is slowly dying and the principle of 
peace is slowly gathering life” and therefore peace should be a strategy but war may 
need still to be unavoidable tactics.  
Nicolson goes on to discuss the public’s lack of confidence in Cabinet 
Ministers. In his view, politicians have no time to be deliberate, have little experience 
of foreign psychology and are always more sensitive to immediate triumph rather than 
the ultimate interests of the state. The displacement of the professional diplomatist 
who is permanent, patient and persevering is for Nicolson most unfortunate. What he 
goes on to suggest then is that negotiation will return to being secret and be left to 
professional diplomats (who have to work in order to regain the public trust they lost 
after WWI) while foreign policy will be public and determined by politicians, who 
will also publicly debate and vote all treaties and agreements. 
Nicolson claims that under democratic diplomacy “policy becomes inevitably 
inconsistent, uncertain and vague”. Commitments made by negotiators, in fact even 
by the American President, may not be worth much as the elected representatives may 
not approve them. Nicolson rushes to offer a solution “no country should promise to 
pay more than its democracy is certainly prepared to deliver” but disregards that his 
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medicine may be worse than the disease as it would severely limit the potential to 
reach any agreement which necessarily requires both sides to move beyond their 
‘comfort zone’. 
Even if negotiators promise only what Parliament would ratify and the 
electorate would be willing to perform, still the electorate do not feel responsible for 
commitments undertaken in their name. As far as Nicolson is concerned, once a treaty 
was properly approved and entered into, it should be illegitimate to question it or 
advocate its repudiation. This proposal is understood from the foreign affairs point of 
view but much less so from the point of view of democracy and ultimate people’s 
sovereignty, particularly if the agreement was ratified thanks to political maneuvers. 
To summarize, the only mechanism of public involvement in foreign policy that 
Nicolson discusses is the personal participation of elected representatives in 
negotiation (they, particularly in the English system, supposedly being sensitive to the 
preferences of their constituencies) in which he finds serious faults. Rather than look 
at other possible mechanisms, he simply proposes to limit public involvement only to 
setting broad policies and agreement approval, basically sending democracy away 
from the agreement formation stage and taking standard negotiation or bargaining for 
granted as the only available method of agreement evolution which in his words “a 
trained professional can handle better than the most gifted amateur”. 
 
Legislating Democratic Control over Foreign Affairs (1945) 
David Levitan, writing in 1945 discusses the legal and constitutional mechanisms for 
democratic control over foreign affairs in the US system of government and how they 
should be exercised to give maximum effect to the will of the people, “speaking 
through their chosen representatives”. 
The paper doesn’t discuss if the will of the people may indeed be developed, 
properly expressed and adequately represented under this system. Levitan takes it for 
granted and questions how the US should go about decisions in foreign affairs. In 
particular is the Senate limited to “advice and consent” or should it be actively 
participating throughout the negotiation? Conversely, if the President entered into a 
treaty, as he allowed to, does this treaty bind Congress even if it requires legislation or 
appropriation, which are under the jurisdiction of Congress?  
Without getting into the peculiarities of the US constitution, this paper 
demonstrates that even if democratic control is construed to be indirect, through 
chosen representatives, so we have in fact an elected President and a ‘constituency’ 
numbering only a few hundred Members of Congress and Senate, the same 
institutional problems and conflicts inherent in democratic control and involvement 
arise.  
An important conclusion from this is that the basic underlying problem may be 
one of institutional design. In absolute monarchies and dictatorships the leader by 
definition speaks for his subjects, well fitting the simple paradigm of nations as 
unitary actors, upon which foreign relations have been traditionally based.  
A much more elaborate institution is required to eventually reach unitary action 
when many people or indeed the entire polity have to be involved. Institutions and 
system of government developed within the states may not be up to the challenge 
because, unlike internal decision-making to solve a given more or less well known 
problem, other equally complex polities are involved who are also in the process of 
their own decision-making and are part of the ‘problem’. The cross dependency 
between these two processes means that in reality diplomacy demands two or more 
complex polities to make up their ‘collective mind’ simultaneously. Designing a 
fitting analog of ‘negotiation’ is the challenge here. 
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Disenchantment (1960) 
Writing in 1960, Cesar Spulveda, a high-ranking Mexican diplomat is already 
disenchanted by democratic diplomacy.  
 
Certain colorful and attractive new forms of negotiating among nations, which arose 
shortly after World War I, combined with the disrepute into which classical diplomacy 
fell in those years, led to the neglect of diplomatic method, which seemed to have come 
to its end. With inordinate optimism it was felt that substitutes for diplomacy were 
superior and more efficient, and that it was reasonably possible to dispense with it as an 
instrument for reducing conflicts among the world powers. 
  
For him, diplomacy is clearly the work of diplomats. He goes on to discuss the 
history of democratization of diplomacy as trying to “bring into the international field 
practices, formulae and ideas which through the years had been applied to the internal 
affairs of the state as essentials of a liberal democracy.” and describes the league of 
nations as a great and original experiment which provides for a system of “diplomacy 
by conference”, entirely opposed to the comfortable method of negotiation of the 
preceding times. This state of permanent conference (now applied in the UN) is what 
he defines to be democratic diplomacy.  
 
In this so-called “democratic” diplomacy, foreign policy and diplomacy proper are 
confused, mingling in a manner, which is not conductive to the proper functioning of 
either… politics as an alternative for diplomacy, with the resulting disregard of the latter. 
 
As the latest outgrowth of ‘democratic diplomacy’, he includes summits by 
heads of state or foreign ministers, which he sees as “trimuph of politics over values 
in the art of negotiation” – moderation and conciliation are abandoned for diatribe, he 
thinks that in every international negotiation public debate it fruitless and ill-fated and 
sometimes divides nations forever. Moreover, it creates a particular problem when 
dealing with dictatorships. 
Spulveda, while paying homage to democracy is much more poignant than the 
other writings in his criticism, even when he echoes previous arguments. He describes 
the inherent conflict between national internal political interest and the needs created 
by external relationship with other countries. Then he laments the vagueness and 
elasticity of ends and objectives in a democracy, its lack of continuity in programs, 
excessive drama in attitudes, ignorance on the part of the people and even of 
governmental agencies. Well-informed sections of the people do not devote 
intellectual efforts to foreign affairs and instead display lack of interest and apathy. 
Objectives of other countries are unknown or ignored, while certain forms of 
knowledge are distorted and generalized and cause even more damage. 
Like Nicolson, Spulveda also notes the irresponsibility of the people in 
exercising their control. They may either not approve negotiated agreements or else 
cause instability by electing a party that opposed a signed agreement, thus eroding 
group accountability that may turn into anarchy. Democratic processes introduce 
inefficient delays compared to autocracies as negotiators must regard public opinion, 
consult with agencies and even with the opposition. While the people must be 
accurately informed, the press shows the most opposed views and most extravagant 
attitudes, while distorting certain aspects or opinions. Nevertheless, democratic 
statesmen must pay homage to the whims of the media and thereby their freedom to 
negotiate is severely limited. Finally, the habit of high-level ‘summitry’ creates 
expectations that may not be met, leads to misunderstandings and breeds confusion.  
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Clearly developments between the world wars have brought much 
disillusionment to proponents of democratic diplomacy. The power of the public to 
influence their government through indirect control and its “negative veto’ power is 
still recognized, appreciated and addressed by the much more used term ‘public 
diplomacy’ (and the existence of such departments in most major foreign offices) but 
the idea of direct public involvement to express the ‘true’ preferences of the electorate 
in negotiation has been virtually abandoned. 
 
Post Cold War Developments (1989-) 
The collapse of the bloc system has triggered the rise of regional and local forms of 
organization challenging the traditional exclusive role of the nation-state as well as 
growing importance for NGO’s international organizations and multi-national 
companies on the world’s arena. This in conjunction with globalization, 
cosmopolitanism and advances in communication technology has sparked a new 
interest in combining democracy and international relations. In the words of Mcgrew: 
 
It is only in the post Cold War era that the historically estranged literatures of 
international relations theory and democratic theory have begun to exhibit a shared 
fascination with the idea of democracy beyond borders, that is transnational (or global) 
democracy. 
 
While transnational democracy could have been called ‘democratic diplomacy’, 
it luckily wasn’t. Therefore I will not go into it in depth here, except for noting that it 
establishes the very important idea that one doesn’t have to be a citizen in a nation in 
order to have some influence, thus providing a much better model for today’s 
complex and inter-dependent world and in particular normatively supporting joint 
decision mechanisms of the type I’m working on. 
It is also worth to mention a very recent use of the term "New Democratic 
Diplomacy – a worldwide attempt to make peace by involving civil society and giving 
voice to muted voices” announced in the Hague Appeal for Peace conference in May 
1999 (see http://haguepeace.org). The charter of this initiative stresses Peace 
education, defined as a participatory holistic process that includes teaching for and 
about democracy and human rights, nonviolence, social and economic justice, gender 
equality, environmental sustainability, disarmament, traditional peace practices, 
international law, and human security. In a sense the wheel (or more optimistically the 
spiral) has completed a full revolution and progressive circles are again harboring a 
Kantian belief that world peace may be established by education and citizen 
participation. Unfortunately, no clear mechanism is proposed for how this 
commendable fit is to be performed.   
 
What can be Learned from Democratic Diplomacy 
Examination of the history shows that the core principle of subjecting foreign policy 
and in particular foreign agreements to democratic guidance and control has 
prevailed. However, an effective mechanism for doing so hasn’t emerged within the 
confines of representative-elitist democracy as practiced in the heyday of the 
movement between the two world wars. This has caused considerable backlash so 
today the norm is that democratic control is exercised mainly postfactum, usually in 
the form of Parliamentary ratification process for international treaties and 
agreements. 
This state of affairs is far from ideal in many respects. In particular it creates an 
inherent conflict between the negotiators and their constituency, which, as Putnam 
(1988) has shown, adversely affects both the chances of a good agreement and 
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internal political stability. I contend that the price is too high to pay, particularly when 
deep salient conflicts that endanger the world peace are at stake. I believe that with 
careful analysis, drawing upon participatory and deliberative practices and addressing 
the true desirables of democratic diplomacy as it should be, it is possible to design an 
institute that would get much closer to the ideal without suffering from the chronic 
illnesses of the approach that was tried and partially failed. 
 
Reinventing Democratic Diplomacy in the Context of an Intractable Conflict 
The literature I reviewed is predominantly occupied with the inward facing aspect of 
democratic diplomacy as viewed from within a well-established liberal democracy. 
Except for a few passing notes about the need to understand the other side, it keeps 
very silent about what may be happening when both sides exercise democratic 
diplomacy and even more so about the possibility of applying democratic diplomacy 
to ethnic conflicts where the collectives involved are people not usually organized as 
two separate and independent states. 
When it comes to resolving intractable ethno-national conflicts, democracy 
itself often seems to be more a liability than an asset. Lay people see the opponent as 
an existential threat and not as a potential partner and have been socialized in the 
ethos of conflict for generations so they are not expected to easily reorient their 
beliefs, develop trust and be willing to take the apparent risks in supporting an 
agreement that would likely give them much less than they have persuaded 
themselves is rightly theirs (Bar-Tal, 2007, Gawerc, 2006, Kaufman, 2006). 
 
Inter-entity vs. Intrastate – a not so Useful Distinction  
For inter-entity conflicts, (like the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian authority 
and the Cypriot conflict since 1974), the situation is basically similar to that between 
states, but aggravated by the existential, identity and religious dimensions that are 
much more dominant. The leaders’ need to ‘sell’ any agreement to their polities 
adversely affects their flexibility to negotiate due to what Putnam (1988) termed ‘The 
two level game’. Moreover, the polities have effective veto power. In particular, 
electing a leader who would ‘drag his feet’ or turn a blind eye towards the extremists 
may suffice to deteriorate and eventually derail even a signed agreement.  
For intrastate ethnic conflicts (like the Jewish-Arab conflict within Israel and 
the Cypriot conflict before the 1974 war), straightforward majoritarian democracy 
mutes the ethnic minority, leaving its members to choose between acquiescing to the 
majority preferences or struggle to gain ‘self rule’ and ‘collective political rights’. 
Conventional wisdom in political science distinguishes intrastate from inter-
entity conflicts and prescribes different means for containing, managing and resolving 
each type. Intrastate conflicts, by virtue of the overarching common citizenship, call 
for stressing the common identity, strengthening the contacts between members of 
both groups, better laws to protect the minority individual rights and in some cases the 
creation of consocional or federal power sharing institutions. The end goal is to get 
the individual citizen on both sides more content and less belligerent.  
Inter-entity conflicts are managed as if they were international conflicts, with 
the state-like entity being the basic unit of analysis. The citizens of each entity are 
given only secondary importance as their entity leaders are considered to be their 
agents. 
I claim that the inter-entity intrastate distinction may be artificial and 
unnecessarily constraining in the quest for the ‘greatest common good’. The 
intractable ethno-national conflict may be a more stable phenomenon than the current 
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borders shaped by the conflict wars, especially if these have not resulted in total and 
irrevocable ethnic separation.  
Consider the Cypriot conflict. If both Turk and Greek citizens preferred a 
separation, it would have been very difficult to peacefully identify, define and 
implement their preference prior to the 1974 war. Afterwards, even if both 
populations preferred unification, defining and implementing this preference became 
increasingly difficult due to the negotiation being between the entities’ leadership and 
being influenced by interests of external powers.  
The Palestinian-Jewish conflict is another example in point. It illustrates the 
difficulty arising when the interim political entity rather than the involved people is 
the overriding unit of organization. The inter-entity and the intrastate part of the 
conflict are clearly linked and should optimally be resolved together. However, no 
paradigm provides for such a linkage and in reality each part impedes progress with 




The PROD Process for Finding the Democratically Preferred Future Scenario 
In Tzur (2008) and elsewhere I suggested that in both intrastate and inter-entity ethno-
national conflict it would be beneficial to evolve the ‘hypothetical future’ most 
democratically preferred by both sides to the ethnic conflict (DPFS). If a compelling 
future agreeable to both sides is identified, it is highly likely that whatever is the 
current democratic political organization; it will have a tendency to gyrate towards 
this future. 
The PROD mechanism I proposed to identify the DPFS may be viewed as an 
elaborate and radical ad-hoc form of democratic diplomacy where opinions of the ‘ad-
hoc electorates’ evolve to become well-considered and well-informed and directly 
influence evolving ‘hypothetical futures’ proposed by anyone who cares to propose 
them (most likely elite groups) in a sort of a competitive open tender.  This happens 
on both sides simultaneously thus providing a mechanism for joint decision where 
internal and external understandings and agreements develop over the same period 
with a built-in feedback. 
In Particular, the publics are involved directly in agreement formation in several 
ways. Firstly, any person or group is free and in fact encouraged to propose and 
develop a future scenario. Secondly, large statistically representative mini publics 
(Goodin and Dryzek, 2006) who are allocated proper conditions for studying and 
deliberating the issues serve as their side’s formal delegation and thirdly, through bi-
directional modern communication and mass media channels that would act to bring 
the scenarios to ‘life’ and provide close-ups on the other side as represented by their 
delegation, (see e.g. Tzur, 2004), everyone is encouraged to get cognitively and 
emotionally involved to whatever degree he or she desires. This openness contributes 
to higher legitimacy of the process and its results as well as for much higher 
considered and deliberated involvement.  
Instead of negotiation that necessitates each side to form a position and then 
stand by it competitively against the other’s side position, the method of evolution 
incorporated in PROD only calls for each person in each delegation to rate the various 
proposed scenarios and optionally provide a rational for his/her ratings. This channels 
the competition away from the relationship and into between the scenarios themselves 
and even more importantly avoids the need for building a consensus within each 
group. 
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Because the ratings of each delegation are transparent, the people and 
delegations on both sides have an opportunity to learn the unfiltered and unbiased 
preferences of the other side. The collective is given a voice much different and much 
more credible than what its leaders are normally saying, thus providing a way for 
citizens to distinguish founded fears and suspicions from their halo.  
The public involvement and a competitive bid as a replacement for negotiation 
are applicable to any high-stake democratic diplomacy, not necessarily in an ethnic 
conflict. More peculiar to ethnic conflicts is the much greater freedom future 
scenarios have in simultaneously addressing bilateral and ‘internal’ issues. A scenario 
may provide for internal rearrangement (such as ‘state building’) or even complete 
reconstitution of the groups and their relationships – a near impossibility when it is 
the self-preserving entities that are negotiating. 
Each side in a conflict is much more heterogeneous than it seems. For example, 
in what is called the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one may find very different groups 
:Israeli Arabs, religious orthodox Jews, Christian Arabs, minorities within minorities, 
refugees, Jews of the world, Palestinian Diaspora etc. Rather then try to make each 
side homogenous and unitary so that it can ‘negotiate’, PROD allows for overlaps in 
interests of sub-groups to be identified and add to the total support of scenarios 
containing them within both populations. 
Finally, Coleman and Lowe (2007) discuss what contributes to people’s 
personal resilience to the detrimental effects of being a part of an intractable conflict. 
PROD by its design is an experiential process that encourages and cultivates many of 
these factors without being ‘educational’: cognitive complexity, tolerance for 
contradiction, constructive engagement with others, intergroup contacts, nonviolence 
approaches, openness and uncertainty, ability to view both sides of the conflict, 
resistance to categorization, differentiate ingroup and outgroup, ability to tolerate 
dissonant information, resisting simplification of issues/solutions, actively seeking 
contradictory information, creative/discovery orientation, actively challenging own 
assumptions about conflict and position and multiple contradictory identities but with 
super ordinate identities associated with fairness and justice. 
 
Israeli Public Perceptions on Reforming the Mechanism of Agreement 
Formation and Approval with the Palestinians 
The preceding section discussed the PROD process as a specific mechanism for 
agreement formation in an intractable conflict and analyzed some of the rational for it, 
mostly in the context of implementing democratic diplomacy. In this section I will 
briefly describe initial results from a study designed to examine how the Israeli public 
evaluates the effectiveness of the current mechanism for achieving agreement with the 
Palestinians and how this perceived effectiveness might change if participatory and 
deliberative democratic reforms are introduced. One specific set of such reforms 
amounts to a partial version of PROD, but many other alternatives have been 
proposed. The presentation here is meant only to provide enough background to 
understand the results of the study. A full and detailed account of the experiment, 
along with a methodological discussion, will be part of my MA dissertation. 
The current mechanism for agreement formation and approval, as agreed upon 
in the Annapolis convention in 2007, is rather standard ‘closed door’ diplomacy. 
Israeli and Palestinian negotiation teams composed of officials and lead by politicians 
conduct a series of bi-lateral meetings in an attempt to reach an agreement. If an 
agreement is reached it will later have to be approved by the governments and 
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parliaments of both sides
2
. The international ‘quartet’ – The UN, the EU, Russia and 
most importantly the US – are supposed to ‘oversee’ the bi-lateral process and help it 
get over the unavoidable hurdles. 
The participatory and deliberative democratic reforms put to the judgment of 
study participants addressed three key areas: Approval of the agreement, where 
reform options included new elections, referendum and personal citizen signing of the 
agreement; Method of Evolution, where an open competition of evolving agreement 
proposals was suggested as an alternative to bilateral bargaining; and Identity of 
Decision Makers in the Actual Formation of the Agreement. Six alternatives were 
proposed to the customary “Political leaders exercising their best judgment” – 
“Leaders implementing an on-going public consultation process”, “Parliaments”, 
“Public voting”, “Public opinion polls”, “Statistically representative mini-publics 




The study was conducted via the Internet on 22-23 September 2008. It consisted of a 
sample of respondents filling out an online questionnaire developed specifically for 
the study. 
Participants and Procedure 
Sixty-two participants were selected by an Internet survey company from its existing 
panel of more than 20,000 Internet users, recruited to participate in Internet surveys. 
The sample was selected so as to approximate the Israeli population in key socio-
economical factors (gender, age, ethnicity, religiosity, education, geographical area 
and income). It should be clear however that with such a relatively small sample, only 
the marginal distributions could be approximately controlled. Participants spent up to 
an hour filling an online questionnaire composed of 40 questions (117 specific 
information items) and were rewarded for their efforts.  
Instrument 
Online questionnaire in Hebrew divided into 3 main sections and several auxiliary 
sections. Most of the questions asked the respondent to express agreement with given 
statements on a scale of 0-totally objects to 10- totally agrees and optionally provide a 
textual explanation. A few strictly qualitative questions were also included in an 
attempt to better understand the respondents’ positions and the level of knowledge, 
understanding and analysis they applied to the questionnaire. 
The first main section described the current mechanism for formation and 
approval of an agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians and then asks the 
respondents to state their agreement with a series of 10 items related to its quality 
(some examples: “The mechanism should be activated immediately with no pre-
conditions”, “Activating the mechanism will increase the internal divide and make it 
difficult to run the state”, “The mechanism truly represents the preferences of the 
citizens” and “With this mechanism, an agreement is reachable within a few years”.), 
9 items related to expected outcome (some examples: “I will be satisfied by the 
agreement”, “I will support the agreement as much as I can”, “It is legitimate for 
opponents to physically object to implementing the agreement”, and “Both sides will 
keep the agreement for several generations at least”) and 4 items related to support of 
                                                 
2
 A legislation initiative, now under way in the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, is that approval will 
require a 2/3 majority of Knesset members’ or else new elections or a referendum.  
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an open border for commerce, tourism, work and residence as part of the agreement 
achieved through the mechanism. 
The second main section divided the ‘mechanism’ into three key areas of 
approval, method of agreement formation and identity of decision makers. For each 
area it presented the current situation along with the possibilities for reform described 
above and asked the respondents to state their agreement with each alternative. 
In the third main section, respondents was asked to select the combination of 
alternatives they most prefers (i.e. to choose the ‘reformed mechanism’) from the 
presented options (and also an ‘other’ option) for each of the key areas. The 
respondents was then asked to answer an identical set of items regarding the quality, 
outcome and open border preferences as previously asked about the current 
mechanism. 
Auxiliary sections included questions from the ‘Peace Index’ for comparison 
purposes, socio-demographic questions, questions about democratic perception, about 
the perceived etiology of the conflict, about the perceived importance of the 
mechanism in resolving the conflict and about prior thinking or knowledge in this 
area.     
 
Results 
One respondent was disqualified  (because of expressing agreement of ‘5’ with all 
statements), making N=61. Also less than 5% of the agreement indications contained 
only a verbal description without an indication of the user’s selection on the requested 
0-10 scale. These missing values were estimated based on the verbal description. 
Sample Demography 
The sample appears to be fairly representative in most of the parameters (percentage 
are rounded so they don’t always sum to 100 exactly): 
• 44% young people (18-35), 34% middle-aged (36-55) and 21% older. 
• 51% women and 49% men, 70% married. 
• 10% have less than high school education, 23% have high school education, 
28% have post high school education, 30% have a first degree and 10% a 
second university degree or beyond. 
• 56% defined themselves as secular, 34% as ‘traditionalists’ and 10% as 
religious. 
• 25% are of northern Israel, 46% from central Israel and 30% from the south, 
Jerusalem and settlers in Judea and Samaria (this partition was chosen to 
isolate people who have more daily friction with Palestinians). 
• 89% are Jewish and 11% are Israeli Arabs (5 Muslim and 2 Christians). 
• 38% defined themselves as belonging to the political “center”, 21% as “left-
center” or “left”, 34% as “right-center”, “right” or “extreme right” and 7% as 
“other”. 
 
As an additional indication, the responses of the sample to a selection of 
questions from the ‘Peace index’ are fairly similar to the ones reported in the ‘Peace 
index’ data that are based on the more established methodology of random telephone 
interviews. 
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Preferences about a reform in the agreement formation and approval mechanism 
• Agreement Approval: 36% prefer a referendum, 25% the existing situation 
(the current government + parliament), 20% new elections, 13% a personal 
signature and 7% ‘other’. 
• Agreement Evolution: 51% an open tender, 39% the existing situation 
negotiation/bargaining), 10% ‘other’. 
• Decision Makers in the Formation of the Agreement: 33% open vote by the 
public, 16% parliaments, 16% leaders according to public preferences, 13% 
the existing situation (leaders according to their best judgment), 10% public 
opinion polls, 8% expert committee, 2% mini public, 2% ‘other’. 
 
In summary, 52% are interested in reforming all 3 areas, 28% want to reform 2 
areas, 10% want to reform one area and only 10% prefer to leave all areas as is. The 
number of areas that the respondent wants to reform was assigned to a variable 
R_Radicality (= Reform Radicality) that may be seen as a measure of the strength of 
support for a reform. 
Effects of Reform on Perceived Mechanism Quality 
As noted above, 55 respondents wanted some kind of reform versus only 6 that 
wanted all the 3 areas of the mechanism to stay as is. The following table summarizes 
the effect that a reform has on each of the mechanism quality measures.   
For example, the first row should be read as follows: On the 0-10 agreement 
scale, the average of reform supporters is 1.87 higher for starting implementing their 
preference of a reformed mechanism than for starting implementing the current 
mechanism. The p-value for a Student’s t-test is 0.00024 – highly significant. For 
comparison, the average change (difference) among respondents who want to keep the 
mechanism ‘as is’ is only 0.17  (if the respondents were completely consistent, it 
should actually have been 0 as their ‘reformed’ mechanism is identical to the current 
mechanism). 
As a more robust and simpler indication, I also calculated how many 
respondents support (agreement > 5) or object (agreement < 5) each of the statements 
for the current and reformed mechanisms. The ‘Change in Support’ column indicates 
that 21.3% more would support starting implementing the reformed mechanism 
immediately than those who support starting implementing the current mechanism 
immediately. Similarly, the opposition is reduced by 11.5% (all of these percentages 
are in terms of the entire sample, not the reform supporters only). 
 













Start implementing the 
mechanism immediately 
+1.87 0.17 0.00024 +21.3% -11.5% 
      
Increase inner conflict and 
reduce ability to govern 
-1.27 -0.67 0.00221 -9.8% +26.2% 
Faithfully represents the people +2.98 -0.67 0.00000 +47.5% -39.3% 
Arises concern -1.69 -0.5 0.00067 -24.6% +21.3% 
I will closely follow +0.98 -2 0.00958 +11.5% -9.8% 
Will impact my trust for the 
other side 
+0.81 -0.67 0.00985 +8.2% -11.5% 
Arises hope +2.22 0 0.00000 +29.5% -26.2% 
Agreement proves ripeness +1.55 0 0.00010 +14.8% -21.3% 
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Non agreement proves non-
ripeness 
+0.11 -0.67 0.40190 -1.6% -3.3% 
      
It is possible to reach an 
agreement within a few years 
+2.02 -0.83 0.00000 +31.1% -29.5% 
 
Table 1 - Effects of Reform on Perceived Mechanism Quality 
 
For reform supporters there is a significant increase in all of the mechanism 
quality measures except for “Non agreement proves non-ripeness”. A reformed 
mechanism is perceived to better represent the welfare and will of the people, if 
successful, it is perceived to prove ripeness and therefore contributes more to trust 
towards the other side, it much less threatens internal stability and causes greater 
involvement and interest. Emotionally it arises much more hope and much less 
concerns. 
All this translates into strong support in immediate activation (65.6% vs. 18% 
who oppose and 16.4% who marked 5 – without preference), much more than the 
support for the current mechanism (42.6% support its immediate activation vs. 29.5% 
and 27.9% who had no preference). Reforming the mechanism also leads to drastic 
increase in the optimism regarding the possibility to reach an agreement within 
several years. 59% agree that this is possible vs. 21.3% who disagree and 19.7% who 
responded ‘5’. For comparison, under the current mechanism only 27.9% agree that it 
is possible to reach an agreement within several years, 49.2% disagree and 23% don’t 
have an opinion. 
The following ‘sunflower plot’ shows for each respondent how much he or she 
agrees with the statement the “agreement is reachable within a few years” for both the 
current mechanism and the reformed mechanism. Where more than one respondent is 
located, additional lines are drawn emanating from the point for each additional 
respondent. Nearly all the respondents are above the line y=x so almost all are more 
optimistic regarding the chances of a reformed mechanism to result in an agreement. 
In addition, the crowded upper left quartile contains all those respondents who 
changed their views from pessimistic to optimistic as a result of a reform. Compare 
this to the lower right quartile that includes only a single respondent that has become 
more pessimistic.  
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Figure 1 – Change in Optimism Regarding the Chances of a Quick Agreement 
 
The great increase in support for implementation and in optimism regarding its 
ability to being about an agreement attest to the fact that respondents see a strong and 
significant connection between the mechanism quality and its ability to advance 
relationships between the conflicting parties at least into the level of an approved 
agreement. 
The next figure shows the change in agreement for the statement “Agreement is 
reachable in a few years” due to a reform as a function of the radicality of the reform 
that the respondent has defined. The regression line 
 
DQ_Agreement_Reachable_in_Few_Years = 0.9640*R_Radicality - 0.4116 
 
Shows clearly (F=7.3064 p=0.00896) that the more a respondent wants a radical 
reform, the more he/she attributes a greater improvement in its ability to bring about 
an agreement. This indicates that the motivation for reform is a desire to reach an 
agreement (rather than for example filibuster an agreement with a cumbersome 
process).     
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Figure 2 - Increase in Optimism for Quick Agreement vs. Reform Radicality 
Mechanism Outcome 
The following table shows the effect a reform has on the outcome measures of the 
mechanism. The values displayed are identical to those displayed in the previous 
table.  
 













Profound positive change in the 
relationships 
+1.40 0.33 0.00112 +18.0% -18.0% 
      
I will be satisfied by the content of 
the agreement 
+1.36 0.33 0.00061 +11.5% -21.3% 
I will support the agreement the best 
I can 
+1.40 0.00 0.00169 +14.8% -16.4% 
I’ll feel committed to abide by the 
agreement even if I don’t like it 
+0.65 -1.33 0.00160 +9.8% -8.2% 
Physical action against the 
agreement is legitimate 
-0.55 -1.83 0.07434 -9.8% +6.6% 
Public action for annulment is 
legitimate 
-0.13 -1.33 0.34060 +3.3% -1.6% 
Agreement will receive wide 
international and Arab support  
+0.33 -1.33 0.19730 0.0% -1.6% 
The current leadership will be 
capable of implementing the 
agreement 
+0.62 -0.67 0.04257 +11.5% -3.3% 
      
The agreement will be kept at least 
for several generations 
+1.31 -0.33 0.00003 +9.8% -21.3% 
      
Border open for residence +0.51 -0.5 0.03454 +3.3% -8.2% 
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Table 2 - Effects of Reform on Perceived Mechanism Outcome 
 
The effect of a reform on the respondents’ expectations for what would happen 
after an approval of an agreement is smaller but still significant in many areas. The 
success of a reformed mechanism is expected to create more feeling of a deep positive 
change in relationship – a very important credit of good will for implementing an 
agreement in the presence of extremists likely to take violent actions against it. The 
expected satisfaction from the agreement and the willingness to support it (even if one 
doesn’t like it) rise substantially as well. 
An agreement resulting from a reformed mechanism is perceived as binding 
more even for its opponents, but only to a mild degree. Similarly, the belief in the 
ability of the current leadership to implement the agreement increases and so is the 
willingness to agree that the border would be open for residence of people from the 
other side who don’t challenge the nature of the state in which they choose to live (A 
reform however doesn’t change the support for opening the border for commerce, 
tourism and work). 
Finally, the optimism that the agreement will be kept for a long time (several 
generations at least) increases rather significantly if the agreement is to be achieved 
through a reformed mechanism. In such case, 41% are optimistic, 32.8% are 
pessimistic and 26.2% incline neither way. This is only a small optimistic majority, 
but it should be contrasted with the large pessimistic majority under the current 
mechanism (29.5% are optimistic, 54% are pessimistic and 16.4% had no preference). 
This result indicates that respondents believe that even the final goal of the 
mechanism – a long-term stable agreement – significantly depends on the agreement 
formation and approval mechanism.  
 
Discussion of Results 
There is relatively little discussion in Israel around the optimality of the agreement 
formation mechanism. For many of the respondents it was the first time ever to 
consider this issue at any depth. Approval has attracted more attention and 
controversy, with demands for approval by new elections, by special parliamentary 
majority, by a referendum or by a Jewish majority to replace the current simple 
majority parliamentary approval. 
Despite the differences in awareness, the little discussed areas “who makes the 
decisions during agreement formation” and “the method of agreement evolution” 
were surprisingly perceived as worthy of democratic reform to at least the same 
degree as approval was. This indicates a clear support for a much more democratic 
diplomacy, at least as far as it concerns resolving the Jewish-Palestinian conflict
3
.  by 
the respondents to  of the agreement it is surprising that most respondents would like 
the mechanism to be reformed and believe that a reformed mechanism will be of 
significantly higher quality and of more effectiveness. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
The idea of democratic diplomacy is, in my opinion, a “diamond in the rough” that 
has never been polished enough for the world to see it glowing. The particular context 
of an intractable conflict, where the issues are so salient, everyone’s life is affected, 
and the interim political units may be weaker than the ethnic or religious affiliation, is 
                                                 
3
 One can only guess what the results would have been if respondents were asked about agreement 
formation and approval regarding e.g. Syria. I would speculate that in this case the preference for 
democratization would be much lower. 
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particularly suitable for an in-depth and serious attempt of realizing the ideal of 
democratic diplomacy. 
The initial empirical results reported in the paper indicate that more or less 
representative respondent think that adding more democracy to diplomacy will make 
the latter significantly better and more effective. Each respondent may have preferred 
different details for the reform, but the direction was very clear – more democratic 
involvement in the agreement formation.  
The PROD process is my proposal for such a reform, as on theoretical grounds 
it seems to satisfy the most desirables. The idea of replacing negotiation with an open 
tender was also favored by respondents but the idea of delegations composed of a 
statistically representative mini-public was not. In its stead the respondents opted 
more for direct democracy, perhaps indicating that it is more in line with their 
intuition of how democracy should be. 
It is my sincere belief that on the basis of what was done so far, it is very 
possible to design an institution or a mechanism that will meet the approval of both 
political scientists and of democratically inclined populations on both sides of a 
conflict. Such a mechanism may be tested on a small scale and, if successful, can 
contribute a lot to intractable conflict resolution or, in the very least, to increasing 
clarity and thus reducing internal conflict.    
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